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Abstract 19 
During the Covid-19 pandemic, universities in the UK used social media to raise awareness 20 
and provide guidance and advice about the disease to students and staff. We explain why 21 
some universities used social media to communicate with stakeholders sooner than others. 22 
To do so, we identified the date of the first Covid-19 related tweet posted by each university 23 
in the country and used survival models to estimate the effect of university-specific 24 
characteristics on the timing of these messages. In order to confirm our results, we 25 
supplemented our analysis with a study of the introduction of coronavirus-related university 26 
webpages. We find that universities with large numbers of students are more likely to use 27 
social media and the web to speak about the pandemic sooner than institutions with fewer 28 
students. Universities with large financial resources are also more likely to tweet sooner, 29 
but they do not introduce Covid-19 webpages faster than other universities. We also find 30 
evidence of a strong process of emulation, whereby universities are more likely to post a 31 
coronavirus-related tweet or webpage if other universities have already done so.  32 
 3 
Introduction 33 
University responses to the spread of respiratory illnesses 34 
Pandemic outbreaks of respiratory illnesses have struck universities for hundreds of years. 35 
European universities have documented the effect of pandemics since at least the 36 
fourteenth century [1-2]. Many American universities closed their campuses during the 37 
influenza pandemics of the twentieth century [3-7].  More recently, universities in Asia were 38 
severely affected by the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and the 2002-04 SARS outbreak.  39 
Universities have incentives to prepare and respond to outbreaks of respiratory illnesses 40 
because they affect student health, reduce academic performance, and lead to increased 41 
use of health care [4, 6, 8-13].  42 
In this context, universities’ first line of defence is influenza vaccination. While seasonal 43 
vaccination does not protect against the uncommon viruses at the heart of pandemics, they 44 
provide a basic level of protection [10] and reduce visits to doctors and health centres, as 45 
well as reduce hospitalisation. As a second line of defence against outbreaks of respiratory 46 
illnesses, universities implement non-pharmaceutical interventions, including isolation, 47 
social distancing, smothering of coughs and sneezes, washing hands, and cleaning touched 48 
objects and surfaces, among others [14-18].  49 
Regardless of the specific interventions implemented to mitigate outbreaks of respiratory 50 
illnesses, universities must rely on timely and effective communication campaigns. In this 51 
light, we present a study of the timing of university communication during the height of the 52 
Covid-19 pandemic in the UK. 53 
 54 
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University communication and social media during the Covid-19 55 
pandemic: a crisis informatics approach to studying the impact of 56 
the pandemic on higher education 57 
In early March 2020, Covid-19 had spread across the UK. At that time, the central 58 
government had not issued university-specific advice. Therefore, universities activated their 59 
response systems and implemented their own measures to control the disease on their 60 
campuses. In the first stage, universities raised awareness, reinforced public health advice, 61 
and provided guidance to students and staff [19]. Later on, they implemented more 62 
stringent measures, including social distancing and remote working for staff, particularly in 63 
mid-March 2020 when preparations for a national lockdown were in progress. In spite of 64 
some initial hesitation, universities closed their campuses to non-essential services by 23rd 65 
March 2020. This variation in university responses to Covid-19 motivated us to look more 66 
closely at how universities reacted to the pandemic. 67 
The initial information campaign on university campuses and the subsequent 68 
implementation of interventions were announced to students and staff through email and 69 
internal newsletters. These emails and newsletters are private tools of internal crisis 70 
communication and the research team did not have systematic access to them. Yet, part of 71 
this engagement was observable in universities’ social media channels, as universities are 72 
aware that students may prefer social media posts rather than emails [20], and this 73 
provided us with a unique opportunity to study how universities responded to the 74 
pandemic. Our investigation indicates that UK universities were making references to Covid-75 
19 in social media since late January 2020. These social media posts generally raised 76 
awareness, reinforced public health advice, and provided guidance.  77 
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The public has been using social media and other forms of communication during crises 78 
to learn and inform themselves [21-22]. Organisations have embraced social media to 79 
enable rapid interaction with stakeholders [23-26]. Universities also use social media to 80 
communicate with students and staff in a frequent, timely, open, and targeted manner [27-81 
32].  82 
The use of social media as a two-way communication channel between universities and 83 
students and staff during the Covid-19 pandemic places our research in the area of crisis 84 
informatics [33-39]. Crisis informatics is a relatively new field that explores the role of 85 
information and communication technology (ICT) in crises. Specifically, it focuses on how 86 
networked ICT facilitates the public’s response to a crisis. The field covers different types of 87 
crises, although it is particularly useful for the study of exogenous events such as natural 88 
hazards [37].  89 
As the role of social media has become more important during crises, crisis informatics has 90 
made significant advances in several subjects, including the role of networked ICT on socio-91 
behavioural factors during emergencies and the use of digital communication as a data 92 
source [37, 39, 40]. At the same time, there are challenges emerging from very large 93 
quantities of unstructured, noisy information. However, if the appropriate methods are 94 
applied to the collection, pre-processing, and analysis of data, social media can provide 95 
useful information for empirical analysis [37-39, 41-42].  96 
We rely on crisis informatics to contribute to the emerging research agenda on the impact 97 
of Covid-19 on higher education [43]. This research agenda, while fragmented and 98 
microscopic [44-45], is making important contributions to our understanding of the effects 99 
of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and the pandemic on higher education. Currently, the emphasis has 100 
been on the disruption to traditional learning and the transition to online learning [46-50], 101 
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as well as on the challenges in this transition, particularly for universities in developing 102 
countries [51-52, 43].  103 
Research has also been devoted to the timing and heterogeneity of non-pharmaceutical 104 
interventions during the height of the pandemic [53-54]. Closely linked to this strand of 105 
work are epidemiological simulations for university campuses that inform university 106 
interventions, including contact tracing and quarantining [55-56]. Interventions are 107 
supported by communication efforts and recent research has focused on communication 108 
strategies [57-60, 20, 45, 51], particularly on the use of social media and its positive effects 109 
on student satisfaction with university responses to the crisis [20, 45]. 110 
The pandemic not only affected students but also university staff, both physically and in 111 
terms of additional work pressure and general uncertainty. Thus, recent research has 112 
focused on the mental and physical health of staff [61-62], and the key role of social support 113 
[61]. Recent work is also addressing the role of university leadership in managing the effects 114 
of the pandemic on campuses around the world and new studies are confirming the positive 115 
effect of women in managing the crisis [63, 20]. 116 
In summation, this paper explores the timing of coronavirus-related messages posted by 117 
universities in social media. Research shows that the timing of interventions can reduce the 118 
negative effects of pandemic outbreaks [64]. This is particularly pertinent to risk 119 
communication and therefore our aim is to explain why some universities posted social 120 
media messages sooner than others. In order to confirm our results, we supplemented our 121 
analysis of social media with a study of the introduction of coronavirus-related university 122 
webpages, which were also widely used by universities to communicate Covid-19 123 
information to stakeholders [53].  124 
 125 
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Theoretical framework 126 
In order to explain variation in the timing of communication, we rely on Situational Crisis 127 
Communication Theory (SCCT) and theories of policy emulation.  128 
During crises, organisations engage in strategic communication. According to Situational 129 
Crisis Communication Theory (65-66), institutions have strong incentives to communicate 130 
early with stakeholders when they are also victims of a crisis. This is often the case when 131 
natural disasters, including pandemics, take place–stakeholders do not attribute the crisis to 132 
the organisation, which in turn can benefit from providing information about the 133 
emergency. In fact, research evidence suggests that early communication by an organisation 134 
when a crisis is attributed to external factors contributes to the perceived credibility of the 135 
organisation (65-69). 136 
This logic is particularly important for UK universities in the context of the pandemic. 137 
According to SCCT, UK higher education institutions are victims of the pandemic and this 138 
gives them incentives to provide early information to their stakeholders in order to gain 139 
credibility. Institutional credibility was crucial because UK universities had to compete for 140 
students in the highly uncertain admission cycle of 2020. In this context of urgency and 141 
competition, our empirical analysis focuses on the variables that best reflect universities’ 142 
organisational capacity and ability to communicate early with students and staff.  143 
Theories of policy emulation also help us understand the variation in the timing of university 144 
communications. While there are nuances across theories of emulation, they generally 145 
focus on the opportunities for policy diffusion: “Policy diffusion is the process whereby a 146 
state is more likely to adopt a policy if other states have already adopted that policy.” [70] 147 
We follow this literature and focus on the role of geographic proximity as a source of 148 
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diffusion, which is best exemplified by Tobler’s first ‘law’ of geography where “everything is 149 
related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things.” [71] More 150 
recent research adds a second ‘law:’ “Everything resembles everything else, but closer 151 
things are more similar” [71]. In terms of crisis communication, we expect that universities 152 
are more likely to communicate early with their stakeholders if universities in their vicinity 153 
have already done so. 154 
 155 
In sum, our study contributes to our understanding of risk communication in the higher 156 
education sector during the pandemic and to our knowledge of the implementation of non-157 
pharmaceutical interventions across campuses in the UK. These interventions, and the 158 
communication efforts that support them, are important because they slow down the 159 
spread of infection on campuses, thus reducing the negative effects of the pandemic on 160 
student health, academic performance, and use of health care. Moreover, and in the 161 
context of the pandemic in the UK, universities filled a vacuum caused by the absence of 162 
central government advice to higher education institutions. In so doing, universities were 163 
confirming their key role as public sources of trust and potentially reducing the negative 164 
effects of a decline of the higher education sector in the UK economy. Universities, as 165 
victims of the crisis, quickly engaged their stakeholders and raised awareness, reinforced 166 
public health advice, and provided guidance through social media, in order to meet their 167 
duty of care and gain credibility in an uncertain admissions cycle.  168 
 169 
Material and methods 170 
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In order to explain why some universities posted Covid-19-related social media messages 171 
sooner than others, we followed a two-fold strategy. First, we collected posts and their 172 
metadata from universities’ official Twitter accounts to identify the date of their first Covid-173 
19-related tweet during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic. Second, we used these dates 174 
to estimate Cox survival models of elapsed time and survival models of diffusion to explore 175 
the role of emulation. We used these two types of models to explore whether universities 176 
choose the timing of communication based only on their university-specific characteristics 177 
or whether they also considered actions taken by other institutions.  178 
To test the validity of our findings from Twitter data, we applied the research design 179 
described above to the dates of universities’ first official Covid-19 webpages. 180 
 181 
Twitter data 182 
The crisis informatics literature explores several peer-to-peer communication platforms 183 
[35]. A large proportion of the research focuses on social media, including “blogging and 184 
microblogging, social networking sites, social media sharing platforms, and wikis” [42]. 185 
Although universities use multiple social media platforms, we focus on Twitter because 186 
most UK universities have a Twitter account. In addition, Twitter’s emphasis on text, as well 187 
as the wide availability of computational methods to pre-process Twitter content and 188 
analyse text as data, make it a suitable source of information for the analysis of risk 189 
communication. In this sub-section we describe how we identified universities’ first tweet 190 
with Covid-19 content.  191 
As a first step, we focused on the Twitter accounts of all officially recognised universities 192 
and colleges in the UK as higher learning institutions that can award degrees [72]. This list 193 
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includes 170 universities, although our sample consists of 166 universities because some 194 
institutions do not have a Twitter account, while others have ceased operations or their 195 
business model is mainly online teaching, which was not as severely affected by the 196 
pandemic. We manually reviewed the Twitter accounts used in this paper to confirm their 197 
authenticity. In addition, we replicated our analyses of Table 1 using only accounts verified 198 
by Twitter; these results are presented in S1 Table. Twitter verifies accounts that are 199 
determined to be in the public interest; this assures the public that these Twitter profiles 200 
are authentic. 201 
As a second step, we collected tweets posted between 31st December 2019 –when the 202 
WHO first identified a statement from Wuhan Municipal Health Commission related to a 203 
new ‘viral pneumonia’– and the end of our study on 6th May 2020. We used Twitter’s public 204 
API to collect tweets that provided data encoded in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON). The 205 
extraction produced 57,340 tweets for the 166 universities in our sample within our period 206 
of interest.  207 
We focus on two attributes of tweets: the text content and the timestamp. The content of a 208 
tweet may contain non-textual characters, including URLs, mentions, hashtags, emojis, or 209 
numbers. We used text pre-processing methodologies to improve the quality of the data, 210 
mitigate the creative use of spacing and punctuation, and remove non-textual content. 211 
These methodologies include separating hyperlinks from the adjacent text, normalising 212 
Twitter-specific tokens (e.g., hashtags and URLs), extracting text from in between symbols, 213 
replacing ampersands, lowercasing the text, normalising multiple occurrences of vowels and 214 
consonants, normalising emojis and numbers, splitting numbers and emojis when adjacent 215 
to text, and removing non-alphanumeric characters. In general, we used text normalisation 216 
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to produce text concordant with standard natural language processing approaches applied 217 
to formal text. 218 
Once we pre-processed all tweets, we applied tokenisation to obtain a bag of words from 219 
each tweet. We then applied pattern-matching rules to extract tweets that mention the 220 
pandemic. Specifically, we used four keywords: ‘coronavirus’, ‘covid’, ‘COVID-19’, and ‘face-221 
to-face.’ Our initial search had a more extensive set of keywords for pattern matching, but it 222 
produced a large set of irrelevant tweets. After some manual exploration, we found that 223 
these four keywords captured the most relevant tweets for the study; they are also a better 224 
reflection of the strict measures that universities would eventually implement, including the 225 
end of face-to-face teaching. 226 
These pre-processing and tokenisation methods reduced our original sample of 57,340 227 
tweets to 7,015 relevant tweets. We then simply ranked them by timestamp to select the 228 
first tweet of each university. We manually cross-checked the first tweet for each university 229 
and removed any results that produced a tweet that was not relevant to our search. Thus, 230 
our final sample includes the date of the first Covid-19 related tweet for 158 universities.  231 
 232 
University-specific characteristics 233 
We use survival analysis –also known as hazard analysis or event history modelling– to 234 
analyse why some universities posted Covid-19 related tweets sooner than others. This 235 
method focuses on time to an event or a transition. In biostatistics, for example, the 236 
emphasis may be on a patient’s time to death or remission after a cancer diagnosis [73]. In 237 
this paper, our event of interest is the first Covid-19 related tweet posted by a university. 238 
Thus, the dependent variable (Days to Tweet) is the number of days from 31st December 239 
2019 to the date of a university’s first Covid-19 related tweet. In our sample of 158 240 
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universities, 153 posted a Covid-19 related tweet; the remaining five universities did not 241 
post a first tweet by the end of our study and therefore we coded them as right-censored. 242 
Our data indicates that the median time to posting the first tweet is 66 days with a 95 per 243 
cent confidence interval of 62 to 72 days. 244 
Fig 1 presents a more systematic analysis of the number of days to post the first tweet 245 
about Covid-19. The figure presents the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival function, 246 
which in this case can be interpreted as the proportion of universities that have not posted a 247 
Covid-19 tweet over time. On 31st December 2019, not a single university had mentioned 248 
the novel coronavirus, but as time went by, more and more institutions posted a tweet 249 
about it. By 23rd March, almost all universities in the UK had mentioned something about 250 
Covid-19 at least once.  251 
 252 
Fig 1. Survivor function of days to first Covid-19 tweet. 253 
 254 
There seem to be three periods in this graph. The first period is between 31st December 255 
2019 and 24th January, when few universities posted their first tweet. In the second period, 256 
starting at the end of January, a larger number of universities posted their first Covid-19 257 
related tweet, thus reducing the survival function drastically–by 28th February 2020, when 258 
the first internal transmission was recorded in the UK, about 45 per cent of universities had 259 
already posted their first message. The third period starts in early March, when the 260 
preparations for strict non-pharmaceutical interventions were underway–by 13th March, 261 
about 70 per cent of universities had posted their first tweet. By 23rd March, almost all 262 
universities had posted at least one Covid-19 message on Twitter. 263 
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Why did some universities tweet sooner than others? In this section, we explore if 264 
universities choose the timing of their first tweet based only on their university-specific 265 
characteristics, such as the size of the student population or university financial resources. 266 
To the best of our knowledge, our paper presents the first analysis of the role of university-267 
specific characteristics on the timing of communication during the Covid-19 pandemic.  268 
First, we expect that universities with larger numbers of students will post a Covid-19 tweet 269 
sooner than universities with fewer students. We conjecture that most students and staff 270 
received official university messages about the pandemic over email or internal newsletters, 271 
but that there is a proportion of individuals who would not read those messages. For 272 
universities with a large number of students, that proportion could equate to thousands of 273 
individuals. In this case, posting messages and announcements in Twitter and other social 274 
media channels might be an effective way of reaching out to students and staff–messages 275 
are short and to the point, and can be re-posted by peers and colleagues, thus potentially 276 
reaching the students and staff who may not have read internal communications. In this 277 
case, posting a tweet sooner rather than later can be an effective way to raise awareness of 278 
the pandemic and provide guidance and advice to students and staff.  279 
To measure the size of the student population in universities, we obtained the total number 280 
of student enrolments by higher education provider and applied a natural logarithm 281 
transformation to this number to produce the variable (ln(Total Enrolment)). This 282 
logarithmic transformation represents the orders of magnitude of student numbers and 283 
allows us to compare cases where some universities have more than 40,000 students and 284 
others have fewer than 500. We do not control for staff numbers because they are highly 285 
correlated with the size of the student population, thus creating a collinearity problem. 286 
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Our second set of expectations is related to resilience. The largest effect of the pandemic on 287 
UK universities will be caused by a decrease in student numbers [74]. In this light, our 288 
baseline model (Model 1) controls for additional university-specific factors that make 289 
universities more or less resilient to a negative shock to student numbers.  290 
Our first control variable is the proportion of university income dependent on tuition fees. 291 
We expect that universities that rely heavily on tuition fees are more sensitive to a negative 292 
shock in student numbers than universities that are more research-oriented. The proportion 293 
of income dependent on tuition fees, which we label (Proportion Income Tuition), is simply 294 
the ratio of tuition fees to total income. Total income is composed of tuition fees, funding 295 
body grants, research grants, investment income, donations, and other income.  296 
Our second control variable is university total reserves. Reserves are a measure of wealth 297 
and we expect that wealthy universities have the necessary resources to protect students 298 
and staff, and the capacity to endure a drastic reduction in student numbers. Total reserves 299 
are measured in millions of pounds sterling and include all types of university reserves, both 300 
restricted and unrestricted. As with the number of student enrolments, we applied a natural 301 
logarithm transformation to this variable to account for a large variation in the data; we 302 
labelled this variable (ln(Total Reserves)). 303 
We excluded the University of Oxford and the University of Cambridge from all our analyses 304 
because they have financial resources that are incomparable to the resources of other 305 
universities, even when a logarithmic transformation is applied. Excluding Cambridge and 306 
Oxford, the mean total reserves for our sample of universities is £218 million. In contrast, 307 
Cambridge has £5.1 billion in total reserves while Oxford has £4.1 billion in reserves. We 308 
also removed from the analysis a very small number of universities that had negative total 309 
reserves. 310 
 15 
Our third control variable is interaction with the public. This variable is measured as the 311 
number of attendants to free events, including lectures, performances, exhibitions, 312 
museums, and other events. As with the total number of student enrolments, we applied a 313 
natural logarithm transformation to account for a large variation in the data; we labelled 314 
this variable (ln(Public Interaction)). Interaction with the public is a double-edged sword, as 315 
it may increase the risk of infection through exposure but also strengthen resilience in terms 316 
of links to the community.  317 
Our fourth control variable indicates whether a university is a member of the Russell Group 318 
of universities: (Russell Group). This variable is equal to one if a university is one of the 24 319 
universities in the Russell Group and equal to zero otherwise. We expect that universities in 320 
this group will be more resilient because they are older –which provides experience in 321 
dealing with crises– but also because they have large financial resources and are research-322 
intensive, which allows them to endure negative shocks to student numbers. We obtained 323 
the list of Russell Group universities from the group’s official website. 324 
S2 Table presents additional analyses that control for the gender of university vice-325 
chancellors and for the proportion of positions in university leadership teams occupied by 326 
women. As mentioned in the introduction, the characteristics of the leadership of an 327 
organisation play an important role on crisis response [75-76, 20], and recent work on 328 
Covid-19 indicates that women are more effective in reducing Covid-19 deaths [63]. Results 329 
from S2 Table indicate that the gender of university vice-chancellors and the proportion of 330 
positions in university leadership teams occupied by women do not have a statistically 331 
significant effect on the timing of communication. The names and gender of university vice-332 
chancellors were obtained from Universities UK [77] and from official university websites. 333 
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The proportion of positions in university leadership teams occupied by women were 334 
obtained from official university websites. 335 
To summarise, our baseline Model 1 of university-specific characteristics includes the 336 
log(Total Enrolment), Proportion Income Tuition, Total Reserves, ln(Public Engagement), and 337 
Russell Group membership. In addition, we estimated two alternative models. Model 2 338 
includes a measure of campus size as given by the number of university buildings per 339 
number of students and staff (Buildings per capita). Model 3 replaces ln(Total Reserves) with 340 
ln(Unrestricted Reserves). Unrestricted reserves, measured in millions of pounds sterling, 341 
are a component of total reserves but do not include sensitive sources of funds, such as a 342 
university’s endowment. We note again that we eliminated Oxford and Cambridge from all 343 
our analyses due to their enormous financial resources–the mean unrestricted reserves for 344 
our sample is £157 million. In contrast, Cambridge has over £3 billion in unrestricted 345 
reserves while Oxford has £2.8 billion. We also eliminated a handful of universities with 346 
negative unrestricted reserves.  347 
The variables ln(Total Enrolment), Proportion Income Tuition, ln(Total Reserves), ln(Public 348 
Engagement), Buildings per capita, and ln(Unrestricted Reserves), were obtained from the 349 
Higher Education Statistics Authority (HESA) [78]. These variables correspond to the 350 
academic year 2018-19, with the exception of the number of buildings, which corresponds 351 
to the academic year 2017-18. These were the most recent statistics available from HESA 352 
when we completed our study and we believe that they have not changed drastically for the 353 
academic year 2019-20. Thus, they continue to provide an adequate reflection of university-354 
specific characteristics during the height of the pandemic. Summary statistics for all 355 
variables for the estimation sample of our baseline Model 1 in Table 1 are presented in S3 356 
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Table. The specific tables from HESA used to support the findings of our study are presented 357 
in S4 Appendix. 358 
We now turn to our estimation procedure. Table 1 presents three Cox-semiparametric 359 
models of our dependent variable Days to Tweet, which is the number of days from 31st 360 
December 2019 to the date of a university’s first Covid-19 related tweet. All models in this 361 
paper were estimated in Stata version 15. We use Cox models because we do not have a 362 
strong theory about the shape of the hazard rate and therefore we prefer to leave it 363 
unparametrized. As long as the proportionality assumption is met by the models, this choice 364 
does not affect the substantive effects of our variables of interest.  365 
We applied four different specifications of proportional hazards tests available in Stata 15 to 366 
all Cox models in this paper, including analysis time, the log of analysis time, one minus the 367 
Kaplan-Meier product-limit estimate, and the rank of analysis time [79]. All models passed 368 
either all four tests or at least two of them; we are confident that they meet the 369 
proportionality assumption. The tests are available in our replication files. If a model passed 370 
only two tests out of four, we decided not to adjust the non-proportional covariate because 371 
all variables in our Cox models are time-invariant and the proper solution to the problem is 372 
unlikely to bring large benefits while causing drastic changes to the research design [80].  373 
The estimation results in Table 1 consist of hazard ratios –that is, exponentiated 374 
coefficients– and their standard errors clustered for the upper-tier local authority (UTLA) to 375 
address a potential lack of independence for universities within the same authority. An 376 
UTLA is a geographic unit in the UK often identical to a county, unitary authority, or London 377 
borough. For ease of interpretation of Table 1, a hazard ratio above one indicates an 378 
increase in the hazard rate–this is the rate at which universities post their first tweet over 379 
time since 31st December 2019. In contrast, a hazard ratio below one indicates a decrease in 380 
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the hazard rate. As an illustration, a hazard ratio of 1.3 indicates that a change in a covariate 381 
increases the hazard rate in 30 per cent, while a hazard ratio of 0.8 indicates a decrease of 382 
20 per cent.  383 
Table 1: Cox Models of Days to First Covid-19 Tweet. 384 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ln(Total Enrolment) 1.387*** 1.397** 1.486*** 
 (0.153) (0.188) (0.189) 
Proportion Income 
Tuition 
0.487 0.474 0.365** 
 (0.256) (0.273) (0.179) 
Ln(Total Reserves) 1.294** 1.302**  
 (0.162) (0.174)  
Ln(Public 
Interaction) 
0.883** 0.879** 0.897* 
 (0.0505) (0.0540) (0.0520) 
Russell Group 1.424 1.451 1.563 
 (0.514) (0.559) (0.562) 
Buildings per capita  0.000148  
  (0.00150)  
Ln(Unrestricted 
Reserves) 
  1.131 
   (0.143) 
Observations 141 135 139 
Subjects 141 135 139 
Failures 139 133 137 
Clusters 88 87 87 
Log L -550.7 -520.9 -542.3 
Dependent variable: Days to first Covid-19 tweet. Event of interest: First Covid-19 tweet. 385 
Results in hazard ratios. Standard errors in parentheses clustered on UTLA. Oxford, 386 
Cambridge, and universities with negative total and negative unrestricted reserves are 387 
excluded from the analyses. 388 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 389 
 390 
Emulation 391 
In this section we investigate if universities consider the actions of other institutions in their 392 
decision to post a first Covid-19 related tweet. To do so, we estimate survival models of 393 
emulation used in the literature on public policy diffusion [81-88]. As mentioned in the 394 
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introduction, “Policy diffusion is the process whereby a state is more likely to adopt a policy 395 
if other states have already adopted that policy.” [70] 396 
We do not aim to understand the causes of emulation –which may be connected to 397 
competition, for instance– but to look for evidence of a diffusion process across UK 398 
universities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of diffusion in university 399 
communication during the Covid-19 pandemic. 400 
Recent models of diffusion rely on dyadic data whereby pairs of states or countries are the 401 
unit of statistical analysis [83-84, 89]. We follow this literature and use dyads of UK 402 
universities as units of analysis. For example, we create the dyad Essex-Bristol, Essex-Kent, 403 
Essex-Roehampton, and so on. For 170 universities, there are 1702=28,900 university dyads. 404 
Each of these dyads is followed daily from 31st December 2019 to 6th May 2020, which gives 405 
us a potential sample of 3,670,300 observations. Our sample is smaller because many 406 
universities posted their first tweet before the 6th of May.  407 
This daily dyadic setup for our data is useful because we can record the date when a 408 
university tweets for the first time and track if other universities have tweeted before in 409 
order to explore the likelihood of emulation. It is precisely for this reason that the dyad 410 
Essex-Kent is not the same as the dyad Kent-Essex: Kent may emulate Essex if Essex tweeted 411 
first, but Essex cannot emulate Kent.  412 
In the daily dyad University A-University B, our dependent variable (Emulation) is equal to 413 
one on the day when University A posts its first tweet if University B has previously posted a 414 
tweet, and zero otherwise. The literature on diffusion prescribes that once Emulation takes 415 
on a value of one on a particular date, it should then be coded as missing; this is simply 416 
because we focus on time to emulation and because once two universities have taken the 417 
same course of action, that is, posting a tweet, emulation is no longer a possibility. For the 418 
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estimation sample of Model 2 in Table 2, there are 5,831 cases where Emulation is equal to 419 
one and 853,141 cases where it is equal to zero. 420 
In a dyad, University A cannot emulate University B if the latter has not posted a tweet in 421 
the first place. Thus, our key determinant of emulation is a variable labelled (B Tweeted) 422 
that is equal to one if University B has tweeted and equal to zero otherwise. For example, in 423 
the dyad University A-University B, the former might tweet on 10th March while the latter 424 
tweeted on 5th March. For the estimation sample of Model 2 in Table 2, there are 171,382  425 
cases where B Tweeted is equal to one and 687,590 cases where it is equal to zero. As 426 
prescribed in the literature on diffusion, the variable B Tweeted would then be equal to zero 427 
from 31st December 2019 to 4th of March and equal to one from 5th March onwards. We do 428 
not expect that a tweet will have an immediate effect and therefore we use a two-day lag of 429 
this event. Our results are robust to the use of three and four-day lags for B Tweeted; S5 430 
Table presents these additional estimation results.  431 
Our dyadic data has all 28,900 dyads and a university may emulate any other university. 432 
Nevertheless, we expect that universities may be more responsive to the actions of their 433 
geographical neighbours because they share similar infection risks. Thus, we created a 434 
variable (Neighbour) that indicates whether two universities in a dyad are geographical 435 
neighbours. The variable Neighbour is equal to one if two universities are separated by a 436 
distance of 50 kilometres of less, and equal to zero otherwise. For the estimation sample of 437 
Model 2 in Table 2, approximately 12 per cent of universities are neighbours according to 438 
this definition.  439 
In S6 Table, we present estimates from the dyadic models of Table 2 using two alternative 440 
definitions of geographic proximity. In the first alternative, two universities are neighbours if 441 
they are separated by a distance of 100 kilometres of less. In the second alternative, two 442 
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universities are neighbours if they are separated by a distance of 25 kilometres of less. Our 443 
results are robust to these alternative definitions of a neighbourhood. 444 
To calculate distances between universities, we used the Google Maps API to request the 445 
full address of each university, including its longitude and latitude. We then used these 446 
coordinates and the package ‘geodist’ [90] in R version 3.5.0 to create a matrix of distances 447 
for each dyad. We follow the literature on diffusion described above and interact the 448 
variable Neighbour with the variable B Tweeted. This interaction of variables allows us to 449 
investigate whether the likelihood of emulation depends on geographic proximity. 450 
In addition to testing for the presence of diffusion, we use our research design to analyse 451 
the effect of the daily number of coronavirus infections in a university’s upper tier local 452 
authority. We focused on infection cases rather than deaths because the recording of Covid-453 
19 related deaths in England is still a matter of debate. The number of Covid-19 cases was 454 
obtained from Public Health England as reported in Coronavirus (COVID-19) in the UK [91]. 455 
For the estimation sample of Model 2 in Table 2, the mean daily number of Covid-19 cases is 456 
0.3 with a variance of 3.32; the minimum number is zero and the maximum is 33. We also 457 
applied a natural logarithm transformation to the number of Covid-19 cases and created the 458 
variable (ln(Covid-19 Daily Cases)). We collected this data on 30th April 2020 and therefore 459 
estimation is restricted to days between 31st December 2019 and 30th April 2020. This does 460 
not affect our analyses, as most universities had posted their first tweet by the end of 461 
March 2020. 462 
The cases of Covid-19 are reported at the upper-tier local authority (UTLA) level in England. 463 
Unfortunately, these figures are not reported for Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. 464 
However, we were able to include observations from universities in Wales, Scotland, and 465 
Northern Ireland until 30 January 2020, when there were no reported cases of infections in 466 
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the UK. There are efforts to collect and organise coronavirus cases for Scotland and Wales 467 
using medical wards [92], but these are not comparable to the UTLAs in England.  468 
We matched universities to UTLAs using their coordinates as explained above and assigning 469 
them to the polygons of UTLAs. These polygons were obtained from the Office of National 470 
Statistics file on Counties and Unitary Authorities (December 2017) Full Clipped Boundaries 471 
in UK [93]. We used the package ‘sp’ [94] in R version 3.5.0 to assign university coordinates 472 
to UTLA polygons. 473 
Our models of diffusion also control for all the university-specific variables used in the 474 
previous section. Although these variables do not change between 31st December 2019 and 475 
6th May 2020, they are useful indicators of university-specific characteristics. Our controls 476 
include university total reserves, and therefore we exclude Oxford, Cambridge, and 477 
universities with negative total reserves from our analyses of emulation. 478 
In dyadic models, it is also recommended that specifications include control variables for 479 
both University A and University B [84]. This is simply because the probability of emulation 480 
depends on the actions of the two universities: the leader and the follower. Thus, all 481 
specifications include controls for both universities in a dyad, which we separate with 482 
subscripts. For instance, Model 2 in Table 2 controls for the natural logarithm of total 483 
student enrolments in University A, denoted, Ln(Total Enrolment)A, and for the natural 484 
logarithm of total student enrolments in University B, denoted, Ln(Total Enrolment)B. 485 
We note that the literature on diffusion finds that traditional dyadic models create a bias in 486 
favour of an emulation effect. The intuition behind the bias is as follows: “Simply put, state i 487 
appears to emulate state j not because it looks to state j as a policy leader, but because both 488 
are independently headed in the same direction and state j may just happened to get there 489 
first.” [84] In other words, the traditional dyadic model cannot distinguish if variables 490 
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increase the likelihood that University B will implement a policy (and therefore that there is 491 
an opportunity for emulation) or if they increase the probability that University A will 492 
emulate University B. The solution to this bias is quite simple; rather than estimating the 493 
original, unconditional dyadic model, one needs to estimate a model that conditions on a 494 
university’s opportunity to emulate. In this light, the purpose of the conditional model is not 495 
to find evidence of emulation but to distinguish if specific variables have an effect on 496 
emulation or on coincidental convergence. 497 
In practical terms, in the conditional dyadic setup, the dependent variable is also Emulation, 498 
but the estimation sample is restricted to those days when there is an opportunity for 499 
emulation, that is, those days after University B has posted its first tweet. Thus, we 500 
condition on the variable (Opportunity), which is equal to one if University B has tweeted 501 
and equal to zero otherwise. For the estimation sample of Model 2 in Table 2, there are 502 
163,670 cases where Opportunity is equal to one and 695,302 cases where it is equal to 503 
zero. In the dyadic conditional model where estimation is restricted to the 163,670 cases 504 
where Opportunity is equal to one, there are 5,831 cases where Emulation is equal to one 505 
and 157,839 cases where it is equal to zero. We note that the variable Opportunity is not 506 
identical to the variable B Tweeted because the opportunity to emulate starts the day after 507 
University B has tweeted. 508 
Table 2 presents three models: a monadic survival model of universities’ first tweet, a 509 
dyadic unconditional model of emulation, and a conditional model of emulation. The goal of 510 
the first model is to explore the effect of Covid-19 cases on the hazard rate of posting a first 511 
Covid-19 related tweet. The previous section did not explore the effect of infections simply 512 
because it uses a cross-section of universities, while the data for infections is measured 513 
daily. Thus, it was more appropriate to present this test here because it uses the same daily 514 
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data organisation than the dyadic models. Having said this, the purpose of Model 2 in Table 515 
2 is to look for evidence of emulation. Model 3 is the conditional model of emulation and its 516 
goal is to differentiate the effect of variables in the likelihood of emulation or coincidental 517 
convergence. 518 
Lastly, we note that all models in Table 2 are discrete survival models [95-96]. Discrete 519 
survival models are implemented as models for binary choice –in our case, a logit model– 520 
that controls for duration dependence by adding a cubic polynomial of days between 31st 521 
December 2019 and the event of interest [96]. In our case, the event of interest in Model 1 522 
is a university’s first tweet, while in Models 2 and 3 the event of interest is emulation. 523 
Results for all models are presented in odds ratios. Standard errors clustered at University A 524 
in the dyad University A-University B are presented in parentheses in order to account for a 525 
potential lack of independence among observations. As in the previous section, we excluded 526 
the University of Oxford and the University of Cambridge, as well as any universities with 527 
negative total or unrestricted reserves. 528 
 529 
















Ln(Total Enrolment)A 1.440*** 1.536*** 1.514*** 
 (0.188) (0.212) (0.211) 
Proportion Income 
Tuition A 
0.750 0.211 0.235 
 (0.649) (0.204) (0.229) 
Ln(Total Reserves) A 1.328* 1.065 1.093 
 (0.194) (0.145) (0.154) 
Ln(Public 
Interaction) A 
0.796** 0.919 0.915 
 (0.0707) (0.0682) (0.0708) 
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Russell Group A 1.921 1.172 1.168 
 (0.763) (0.564) (0.569) 
Ln(Covid-19 Daily 
Cases) A 
2.341*** 1.505*** 1.375** 
 (0.390) (0.239) (0.215) 
Days A 1.137*** 0.828*** 0.562*** 
 (0.0512) (0.0363) (0.0373) 
Days2 A 0.998* 1.005*** 1.011*** 
 (0.000966) (0.00109) (0.00146) 
Days3 A 1.000** 1.000*** 1.000*** 
 (0.00000575) (0.00000717) (0.00000915) 
Ln(Total Enrolment)B  0.955*** 0.980 
  (0.0109) (0.0131) 
Proportion Income 
Tuition B 
 1.226** 2.243*** 
  (0.114) (0.274) 
Ln(Total Reserves) B  1.018 0.963* 
  (0.0175) (0.0190) 
Ln(Public 
Interaction) B 
 1.009 1.024*** 
  (0.00670) (0.00718) 
Russell Group B  1.014 1.228*** 
  (0.0303) (0.0489) 
Ln(Covid-19 Daily 
Cases) B 
 1.413*** 1.362*** 
  (0.0757) (0.0653) 
B Twitted A(t-2)  27.91***  
  (7.157)  
(Neighbour)(B 
Twitted A(t-2)) 
 0.646***  
  (0.0545)  
Neighbour   0.682*** 
   (0.0537) 
Constant 0.000102*** 0.000132*** 3.957 
 (0.000109) (0.000126) (4.227) 
Observations 6930 858972 163670 
Clusters 131 141 140 
Pseudo-R2 0.167 0.352 0.175 
Log L -480.9 -22637.1 -20753.8 
Dependent variable (Model 1): First Covid-19 tweet. Dependent variable (Models 2-3): 531 
Emulation of first Covid-19 tweet. All models are discrete survival models with logit link and 532 
cubic polynomial for number of days to event. Results in odds ratios. Standard errors in 533 
parentheses clustered by university A. Oxford, Cambridge, and universities with negative 534 
total reserves are excluded from the analyses. 535 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 536 
 537 
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Webpages data 538 
In this section we supplement our analysis of Twitter data with information from university 539 
webpages. Universities also used Covid-19 dedicated webpages to raise awareness of the 540 
pandemic and provide guidance and advice to students and staff [53]. We acknowledge that 541 
the content of Covid-19 specific webpages is different than Twitter posts–webpages require 542 
more careful planning and implementation than tweets, as well as constant updating and 543 
maintenance. It is precisely for this reason that an analysis of webpages is important, as any 544 
confirmation of substantive results will give more confidence to the analysis presented in 545 
the previous section. 546 
Our research design is the same as in our analysis of Twitter data. We explored if 547 
universities introduce Covid-19 webpages based on their own factors and the actions taken 548 
by other universities. We also used the same estimation methods. First, we used Cox 549 
models for the analysis of the number of days to posting a first webpage, as well as the 550 
same university-specific control variables. Second, we used models of diffusion and 551 
controlled for the same time-varying variables as in the previous section, including the 552 
introduction of webpages by other universities and the number of Covid-19 cases in a 553 
university’s UTLA. 554 
We began by identifying the date when universities first introduced a webpage with Covid-555 
19 related information. We first mapped UK universities to their corresponding web 556 
domains, for instance essex.ac.uk. We then used the Google Search API to search every 557 
domain from 31st December 2019 to 6th May 2020 for the Covid-19 related keywords: 558 
‘Covid-19’, ‘Corona,’ and ‘Coronavirus.’ The returned results for each matching page 559 
included a summary snippet, a title, and a Uniform Resource Locator (URL).  560 
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Unlike tweets, these webpages are as noisy as they are heterogenous in design, and a one-561 
size-fits-all approach to noise reduction would not be useful to extract content. Therefore, 562 
our text extraction was limited to the page body, which allowed us to focus on the main text 563 
in a webpage while limiting noise in the navigation menus or announcements that contain 564 
Covid-19 related terms. This process produced 13,265 matching webpages for 128 565 
universities.  566 
We sorted these matching webpages by date and manually inspected the top result for each 567 
university to minimise noise. We used the dates from these webpages to produce the 568 
dependent variable (Days to Webpage), which is the number of days from 31st December 569 
2019 to the date of a university’s first Covid-19 webpage as described above. We note that 570 
we do not have any right-censored cases because our data collection produced a sample of 571 
128 universities with a webpage. Unfortunately, we cannot be sure that the remaining 42 572 
universities in the UK did not introduce a Covid-19 webpage and therefore it would be 573 
incorrect to code them as right-censored. Having said this, our data indicates that the 574 
median time to posting the first webpage is 55 days with a 95 per cent confidence interval 575 
of 43 to 63 days. Fig 2 presents the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival function of the 576 
number of days to introduce a webpage about Covid-19.  577 
 578 
Fig 2. Survivor Function of Days to First Covid-19 Webpage. 579 
 580 
We now turn to our estimation strategy. For the Cox models, our dependent variable is the 581 
number of days from 31st December 2019 to the date when a university first introduced a 582 
Covid-19 webpage.  583 
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Table 3 presents three Cox-semiparametric models of our dependent variable (Days to 584 
Webpage). As in the previous section, we use Cox models because we do not have a strong 585 
theory about the shape of the hazard rate and therefore we prefer to leave it 586 
unparametrized. Likewise, the estimation results in Table 3 consist of hazard ratios with 587 
their standard errors clustered for the upper-tier local authority (UTLA) presented in 588 
parentheses. 589 
Table 3: Cox Models of Days to First Covid-19 Webpage. 590 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Ln(Total Enrolment) 1.340*** 1.482*** 1.361*** 
 (0.150) (0.220) (0.153) 
Proportion Income 
Tuition 
0.188*** 0.254*** 0.175*** 
 (0.0999) (0.128) (0.0923) 
Ln(Total Reserves) 1.058 1.079  
 (0.139) (0.154)  
Ln(Public 
Interaction) 
0.982 1.004 0.987 
 (0.0525) (0.0506) (0.0526) 
Russell Group 1.134 1.027 1.286 
 (0.429) (0.395) (0.474) 
Buildings per capita  271972.2  
  (2475205.5)  
Ln(Unrestricted 
Reserves) 
  0.980 
   (0.108) 
Observations 111 106 109 
Subjects 111 106 109 
Failures 111 106 109 
Clusters 77 76 76 
Log L -409.0 -384.7 -400.0 
Dependent variable: Days to first Covid-19 webpage. Results in hazard ratios. Standard 591 
errors in parentheses clustered on UTLA. Oxford, Cambridge, and universities with negative 592 
total and unrestricted reserves are excluded from the analyses. 593 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 594 
 595 
We now turn to our analysis of emulation, which used the same specifications as the 596 
emulation models of Twitter data, although the key determinant of emulation in this section 597 
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is a variable labelled (B Webpage) that is equal to one if University B has introduced a Covid-598 
19 webpage and equal to zero otherwise. For the estimation sample of Model 2 in Table 4, 599 
there are 99,214 cases where B Webpage is equal to one and 307,954 cases where it is 600 
equal to zero. 601 
We estimated three models: one monadic model of universities’ first Covid-19 related 602 
webpage, and two dyadic models of emulation, one unconditional and one conditional. For 603 
the estimation sample of Model 2 in Table 4, there are 3,405 cases where Emulation is equal 604 
to one and 403,763 cases where it is equal to zero. In the same sample, there are 95,459 605 
cases where Opportunity is equal to one and 311,709 cases where it is equal to zero. 606 
Conditioning the analysis to the 95,459 cases where Opportunity is equal to one, there are 607 
3,405 cases where Emulation is equal to one and 92,054 cases where it is equal to zero.  608 
Table 4 presents results in odds ratios, which reflect changes in the odds of posting a first 609 
Covid-19 related webpage in Model 1 and the odds of emulation in Models 2-3. Standard 610 
errors clustered at University A in dyad University A-University B are presented in 611 
parentheses in order to account for a potential lack of independence among observations. 612 
As in the previous section, we excluded the University of Oxford and the University of 613 
Cambridge, as well as any universities with negative total or unrestricted reserves.  614 
Our results are robust to the use of three and four-day lags for B Webpage for Model 2 in 615 
Table 4 (results presented in S7 Table), and to alternative definitions of a neighbourhood in 616 
the dyadic models of Table 4 (results presented in S8 Table). 617 
 618 





Model 2: Model 3: 
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Ln(Total Enrolment)A 0.952 1.277 1.276 
 (0.145) (0.218) (0.217) 
Proportion Income 
Tuition A 
0.203* 0.677 0.678 
 (0.185) (0.774) (0.774) 
Ln(Total Reserves) A 1.338* 1.207 1.211 
 (0.208) (0.231) (0.232) 
Ln(Public 
Interaction) A 
1.015 1.004 1.004 
 (0.0565) (0.0526) (0.0524) 
Russell Group A 0.862 0.724 0.721 
 (0.537) (0.347) (0.349) 
Ln(Covid-19 Daily 
Cases) A 
1.921** 1.616* 1.600* 
 (0.612) (0.402) (0.396) 
Days A 1.203** 1.102 1.034 
 (0.101) (0.0694) (0.0670) 
Days2 A 0.997* 0.998 0.999 
 (0.00185) (0.00136) (0.00138) 
Days3 A 1.000* 1.000 1.000 
 (0.0000123) (0.00000850) (0.00000856) 
Ln(Total Enrolment)B  0.996 1.004 
  (0.0115) (0.0109) 
Proportion Income 
Tuition B 
 0.882*** 0.931* 
  (0.0428) (0.0373) 
Ln(Total Reserves) B  1.023** 1.006 
  (0.00932) (0.00961) 
Ln(Public 
Interaction) B 
 0.989** 0.989** 
  (0.00410) (0.00424) 
Russell Group B  1.009 0.984 
  (0.0134) (0.00968) 
Ln(Covid-19 Daily 
Cases) B 
 1.076 1.070 
  (0.0617) (0.0605) 
B Webpage A(t-2)  30.79***  
  (4.353)  
(Neighbour)(B 
Webpage A(t-2)) 
 0.837**  
  (0.0748)  
 31 
Neighbour   0.849* 
   (0.0725) 
Constant 0.000691*** 0.00000388*** 0.000426*** 
 (0.00111) (0.00000558) (0.000625) 
Observations 4061 407168 95459 
Clusters 81 109 109 
Pseudo-R2 0.136 0.327 0.127 
Log L -312.4 -13252.3 -12821.1 
Dependent variable (Model 1): First Covid-19 webpage. Dependent variable (Models 2-3): 620 
Emulation of first Covid-19 webpage. All models are discrete survival models with logit link 621 
and cubic polynomial for number of days to event. Results in odds ratios. Standard errors in 622 
parentheses clustered by university A. Oxford, Cambridge, and universities with negative 623 
total reserves are excluded from the analyses. 624 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 625 
 626 
Results and discussion 627 
We organise our discussion around our two sets of results. First, we discuss the effects of 628 
the size of the student community, the role of universities’ financial resources, and the 629 
impact of Covid-19 infections on the hazard rate of posting a first Covid-19 related tweet. 630 
We then consider if evidence from our analysis of university webpages supports our 631 
conclusions. Second, we discuss the role of emulation and whether estimation results are 632 
consistent across our two sources of data.  633 
In order to guide our discussion, we focus on the hazard ratios of independent variables, 634 
and particularly if they are above one (increase hazard rates) or below one (decrease hazard 635 
rates), at an alpha level of 0.05. For consistency, we apply the same terminology to Cox 636 
models and our discrete survival models with logits links.  637 
 638 
University size, financial wealth, and infections 639 
Our first expectation is related to the size of the student community. We conjectured that 640 
not all university students and staff read university Covid-19 announcements communicated 641 
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via email and internal newsletters. In fact, students may prefer social media posts rather 642 
than emails [20]. Therefore, universities have incentives to reinforce these announcements 643 
through social media; these incentives are stronger in large institutions simply because the 644 
number of individuals who may not have read private messages is larger. Thus, we expected 645 
that the number of student enrolments would increase the hazard rate of posting a first 646 
Covid-19 tweet. The hazard ratios for Ln(Total Enrolment) in the Cox models of Table 1 and 647 
the monadic model of Table 2 are well above one and statistically significant. This indicates 648 
that changes to the natural logarithm of total enrolment –which can also be interpreted as 649 
the elasticity of enrolment or per cent changes in total enrolment– increase the hazard rate 650 
of posting a tweet. In other words, universities with larger numbers of students tweeted 651 
sooner than universities with fewer students. This effect is also present in our analyses of 652 
universities with verified Twitter accounts, presented in S1 Table.  653 
Our second set of expectations focuses on university-specific characteristics that determine 654 
resilience to a negative shock in student numbers. While there are multiple characteristics 655 
that deserve discussion, we highlight the role of financial resources because we expect that 656 
they will increase university resilience in the same way that countries’ wealth strengthens 657 
disaster preparedness and response [97-99].  658 
The hazard ratios for Ln(Total Reserves) in the Cox models of Table 1 are well above one and 659 
statistically significant, which indicates that per cent changes in total reserves increase the 660 
hazard rate of posting a Covid-19 related tweet. While the monadic model of Table 2 661 
indicates that the hazard ratio for Ln(Total Reserves) is significant only at an alpha level of 662 
0.1, our analyses of universities with verified Twitter accounts in Table 2 confirm that wealth 663 
increases the hazard rate. Altogether, we find that wealthier universities were more likely to 664 
tweet sooner than universities with more modest means. 665 
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In the context of the current pandemic, we explored the effect of the number of Covid-19 666 
cases on the hazard rate of posting a Covid-19 related tweet. To do so, we used the daily 667 
number of infections in universities’ upper-tier local authority as a control variable in our 668 
monadic model of universities’ first Covid-19 related tweet in Table 2. The hazard ratio for 669 
Ln(Covid-19 Daily Cases)A in this model is well above two and statistically significant, which 670 
indicates that per cent changes in Covid-19 cases greatly increase the hazard rate of posting 671 
a first Covid-19 tweet.  672 
We also note that the hazard ratio for Ln(Covid-19 Daily Cases)A in the dyadic models of 673 
Table 2 are also above one and significant, which indicates that Covid-19 infections also 674 
increase the likelihood of emulation. The fact that the coefficients for Ln(Covid-19 Daily 675 
Cases)A are quite similar across the unconditional and conditional dyadic models suggests 676 
that infections are driving emulation and not coincidental convergence. 677 
We now consider if the effects of the size of the student community, the role of universities’ 678 
financial resources, and the impact of Covid-19 infections in our Twitter data are also 679 
present in our analyses of university webpages. 680 
We acknowledged that data from Twitter can be quite noisy and therefore we 681 
supplemented our analyses with information from official university Covid-19 webpages. 682 
We identified the date when universities first introduced a Covid-19 webpage and then 683 
applied the same research design implemented for our Twitter data to estimate survival 684 
models and models of diffusion. To summarise these results, the analyses from webpages 685 
provide moderate support for the effect of university size and indicate that university 686 
financial resources do not have a statistically significant effect on the hazard rate of 687 
introducing a webpage. Nonetheless, these analyses confirm the effect of Covid-19 infections 688 
on the odds of introducing a first Covid-19 webpage. 689 
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First, the hazard ratios for Ln(Total Enrolment) in the Cox models of Table 3 are well above 690 
one and statistically significant, which indicates that per cent changes in student enrolments 691 
increase the hazard rate of introducing a Covid-19 webpage.  However, the monadic model 692 
of a first Covid-19 webpage in Table 4 indicates that student enrolments do not have a 693 
significant effect on the rate of introducing a webpage. We consider that this is only 694 
moderate support for the effect of the size of the student community on the hazard rate of 695 
introducing a webpage.  696 
Moreover, the models do not find support for an effect of university financial resources. In 697 
fact, all Cox models in Table 3 find that Ln(Total Reserves) does not have a statistically 698 
significant effect, while the monadic model of a first Covid-19 webpage in Table 4 indicates 699 
that university resources would increase the hazard rate of introducing a webpage only at 700 
an alpha level of 0.1. This suggests that university reserves do not determine the likelihood 701 
of introducing a Covid-19 webpage. 702 
Nevertheless, our analyses of webpage data confirm the effect of Covid-19 infections on the 703 
timing of risk communication. Indeed, the hazard ratio for Ln(Covid-19 Daily Cases)A in the 704 
monadic model of universities’ first webpage in Table 4 is well above one and statistically 705 
significant, which indicates that per cent changes in Covid-19 cases increase the hazard rate 706 
of tweeting.  We also observed this effect in our analysis of universities’ first Covid-19 707 
tweet. 708 
It is also important to note that the hazard ratio for Ln(Covid-19 Daily Cases)A in the dyadic 709 
models of Table 4 is also above one and significant, which indicates that Covid-19 infections 710 
also increase the likelihood of emulation. As with Twitter data, the coefficients for Ln(Covid-711 
19 Daily Cases)A are very similar across the unconditional and conditional dyadic models, 712 




One of the central features of our research design is the estimation of models of diffusion. 716 
We estimated conditional and unconditional dyadic models of emulation to explore 717 
whether universities choose the timing of communication based only on their own 718 
university-specific characteristics or whether the actions of other universities also 719 
contributed to their response. As mentioned, we do not aim to understand the causes of 720 
emulation but to look for evidence of a diffusion process across UK universities.  721 
Our unconditional dyadic model of emulation in Table 2 indicates that the hazard ratio for B 722 
Tweeted A(t-2) is very well above one and statistically significant. This suggests that 723 
universities are much more likely to follow institutions that have previously posted a Covid-724 
19 related tweet. This effect is also present when we use three and four-day lags for B 725 
Tweeted, as indicated in our supplementary analyses in S5 Table. Evidence of emulation is 726 
one of the strongest results in our analyses and it is also replicated in our study of university 727 
webpages. 728 
Interestingly, while a follower’s likelihood of emulation is higher when other universities 729 
have posted a tweet, this likelihood is not as high if the leading university is a geographical 730 
neighbour, as demonstrated by the hazard ratio for (Neighbour)(B Tweeted A(t-2)) in Table 2, 731 
which is smaller than one and statistically significant. We confirmed this effect in our 732 
supplementary analyses in S6 Table, which use two alternative definitions of a 733 
neighbourhood. 734 
Our analyses of university webpages strongly confirm that universities are more likely to 735 
emulate if other institutions have previously posted a Covid-19 related webpage. Results 736 
 36 
from Table 4 indicate that the hazard ratio for B Webpage A(t-2) is also very well above one 737 
and statistically significant. The results are of the same magnitude, direction, and 738 
significance as in our analyses of Twitter data– this is a very strong indication of the effect of 739 
diffusion in university responses during the pandemic. Moreover, this effect is also present 740 
when we use three and four-day lags for B Webpage, as indicated in our supplementary 741 
analyses in S7 Table. They also confirm that while a follower’s likelihood of emulation is 742 
higher when other universities have posted a webpage, this likelihood is not as high if the 743 
leading institution is a geographical neighbour, even when different definitions for a 744 
neighbourhood are used for estimation, as demonstrated in S8 Table. 745 
 746 
These results point to a form of inequality among universities in the UK. Our estimation 747 
results indicate that universities with large student communities are quicker to engage in 748 
risk communication as measured by the timing of their first Covid-19 tweet and their first 749 
Covid-19 webpage. While all universities have similar incentives to reach out sooner to 750 
larger numbers of students during crises, the ability to do so depends on wealth. It is 751 
therefore not a coincidence that our estimation results suggest that universities with large 752 
financial resources, as measured by total reserves, are also quicker to engage in risk 753 
communication over social media.  754 
Universities with large student communities and vast financial resources have something 755 
else in common: age. In the UK, a university’s age is crucial because it brings wealth and 756 
experience with previous crises, and research shows that this has a positive effect in 757 
prevention [100, 97]. This simply means that older universities are wealthier, larger, and 758 
more experienced, and altogether more resilient to pandemics. These characteristics allow 759 
them to engage in risk communication at an earlier stage than other universities. Smaller, 760 
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poorer, younger universities are not so resilient and this is reflected in the timing of their 761 
risk communication, which lags behind the efforts of more established universities. This 762 
coincides with the finding by the Institute of Fiscal Studies that universities with weak 763 
financial positions before the pandemic are at higher risk of insolvency as a result of the 764 
shock to student numbers [74]. 765 
On the more positive side, our analyses show that universities learn from each other. This 766 
means that there is a space for leadership and an opportunity for coordination during crises. 767 
While some coordination was organised by Universities UK, in terms of the negative 768 
consequences of the pandemic on universities’ financial positions, there is a need for better 769 
coordination in the delivery of risk communication and the sharing of best practice that can 770 
allow the system to learn more quickly and respond more effectively to crises.  771 
Indeed, a more effective crisis response would reduce the negative effects of the pandemic 772 
on the education sector and its link to the national economy. The UK education sector 773 
produces close to six per cent of national output and in the second quarter of 2020 it was 774 
estimated that 90 per cent of this output would be lost due to the pandemic [101]. At that 775 
time, multiple studies predicted that UK universities would lose billions of pounds in the 776 
long run and that some institutions would not be financially viable without significant 777 
government assistance [101, 74]. Our study shows that UK universities engaged in swift 778 
crisis communication in the absence of central government guidelines, which probably 779 
reduced some of the negative consequences of the pandemic. 780 
In this light, we draw important lessons for universities around the world and contribute to 781 
our general understanding of the effects of the pandemic on higher education. Although the 782 
empirical results are only valid for institutions in the UK, the paper provides a useful 783 
research design that can be replicated for data on university responses in other countries 784 
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[53, 59]. In addition, our theoretical framework and selection of covariates, as well as the 785 
emphasis on survival analysis and models of policy diffusion, will serve as useful guidelines 786 
for further research.  787 
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